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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the determinants of group membership and social networks of 
rural households using a unique longitudinal data set from the rural Philippines.  We 
investigate two types of social capital:  membership in groups (production, credit, burial, 
religious and civic groups), or “formal” social capital, and size of trust-based networks or 
“informal” social capital.  Because men and women may have different propensities to 
invest in social capital, we analyze the determinants of group membership both at the 
household level and for men and women separately. We also disaggregate the analysis by 
type of group. The paper examines the determinants of the density of social capital, 
proxied by the number of groups and the number of network members. Finally, it 
explores various reasons why people might join groups—whether groups increase trust, 
or whether groups increase well-being, as proxied by per capita expenditure.  We find that 
asset-rich, better-educated households and households living closer to town centers are 
more likely to participate in groups and to have larger social and economic assistance 
networks.  Different aspects of village-level heterogeneity have different impacts on 
group membership, and greater exposure to shocks and a higher incidence of peace and 
order problems increase group membership.  Men and women do not differ significantly 
in the number of groups they join, however, there are clear gender differences in the types 
of groups to which men and women belong.  We also find that group membership does 
not, in general, increase network density and we do not find evidence of positive returns 
to group membership in terms of increased per capita expenditures. 
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Philippine Communities 
Marie Godquin




This paper explores the determinants of group membership and social networks of 
rural households using a unique longitudinal data set from the rural Philippines.  We 
investigate two types of social capital:  membership in groups (production, credit, burial, 
religious and civic groups), or “formal” social capital, and size of trust-based networks or 
“informal” social capital.  Because men and women may have different propensities to invest 
in social capital, we analyze the determinants of group membership both at the household 
level and for men and women separately. We also disaggregate the analysis by type of group. 
The paper examines the determinants of the density of social capital, proxied by the number 
of groups and the number of network members. Finally, it explores various reasons why 
people might join groups—whether groups increase trust, or whether groups increase well-
being, as proxied by per capita expenditure.  We find that asset-rich, better-educated 
households and households living closer to town centers are more likely to participate in 
groups and to have larger social and economic assistance networks.  Different aspects of 
village-level heterogeneity have different impacts on group membership, and greater exposure 
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to shocks and a higher incidence of peace and order problems increase group membership.  
Men and women do not differ significantly in the number of groups they join, however, there 
are clear gender differences in the types of groups to which men and women belong.  We also 
find that group membership does not, in general, increase network density and we do not find 
evidence of positive returns to group membership in terms of increased per capita 
expenditures. 
Formal membership in groups has increasingly been promoted as a way for the asset-
poor to invest in another type of asset—social capital. Defined by Putnam (1995) as “features 
of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation,” social capital has attracted much attention from development practitioners, 
especially in grassroots participation and empowerment efforts. International organizations, 
governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have enthusiastically embraced the 
concept as an alternative to government or market-based approaches, with the World Bank 
hailing it as “the missing link” in development (Dikito-Wachtmeister 2001). Working through 
groups also reduces the cost of delivering services to many individuals, making the outreach 
of programs more cost-effective.  While Narayan (1999) emphasizes the “social” aspects of 
social capital, various studies (e.g. Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Maluccio et al. 2000; Haddad 
and Maluccio 2003) have emphasized its “capital”-like qualities by demonstrating the positive 
impact of social capital on measures of household welfare such as per capita household 
consumption or income.  
 Participation in groups is a commonly used indicator of social capital, although there 






and Haddad and Maluccio 2003).   One reason behind development practitioners’ interest in 
social capital as an asset for the poor is the perception that it is relatively costless to acquire, 
unlike other assets such as land.  However, the poor may face barriers to participation in 
groups. Participation in groups is not costless—networking takes time, especially when 
formal group meetings are required, and many groups require fees to participate.  Individuals 
with less education may feel intimidated about speaking up in a group, especially groups with 
better-educated and higher-status members. Social inequality and ethnic differences may also 
create barriers to social capital accumulation.  Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) demonstrate, 
using data from the United States, that after controlling for individual characteristics, 
participation in social activities is significantly lower in more unequal and in more racially or 
ethnically fragmented localities. 
Among possible barriers to acquiring social capital, gender differences are of special 
concern to development practitioners, who view social capital as a means for empowering 
women.  In societies where women are disadvantaged in acquiring assets, participation in 
groups, particularly credit groups, has been touted as a collateral substitute.  However, women 
in poor households face particularly serious time constraints because of their various 
livelihood activities and childcare responsibilities. Membership fees may create a further 
barrier to participation by poor women, who have limited control over cash resources. 
Although both men and women with low levels of education may feel awkward about 
participating in groups, the fear that they will be perceived as “ignorant” or as having nothing 
to contribute may be more acute for women when cultural norms discourage women from 






worth their time and effort to participate in group meetings if they believe they will not be 
heard (Dikito-Wachtmeister 2001)  
Households and individuals may also invest in other forms of social capital that are 
less formal than membership in groups.  Informal social networks have attracted attention as a 
possible mechanism for risk-smoothing (Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Hoddinott et al. 2005; 
Fafchamps and Gubert 2004), although recent evidence from the Cordillera region of the 
Philippines suggests that pre-existing personal relationships, rather than risk-pooling, 
motivates network formation (Fafchamps and Gubert 2004).  In the Cordillera study, 
interpersonal relationships are strongly correlated with geographic proximity, and only weakly 
related with diversification against risk, except in the case of health risk. 
This paper is an initial exploration into group membership and social networks of rural 
households using a unique longitudinal data set from the rural Philippines.  Findings from this 
study will be used to design a qualitative study on the role of collective action in coping with 
risk.  The Bukidnon Panel Study follows up 510 families in rural Mindanao who were first 
interviewed in 1984/85 by the International Food Policy Research Institute and the Research 
Institute for Mindanao Culture, Xavier University, as well as a sample of their offspring living 
in the same area and those who have moved to a different location.  Parents (original 
respondents) and a subsample of up to two children who formed separate households in the 
same locality were interviewed in 2003; migrants to rural and urban areas were interviewed in 
2004.  The analysis in this paper is restricted to original respondents who were interviewed in 






taking into account the 1984 sample design and to use lagged variables from 1984 as 
instruments for current participation in groups.  
Because Mindanao is the Philippines’ poorest region, and because asset inequality and 
ethnic conflict contribute to civil unrest in that region, we pay close attention to the role of 
asset and other inequality as possible barriers to the accumulation of social capital.  We 
investigate two types of social capital:  membership in groups, or “formal” social capital, and 
size of trust-based networks or “informal” social capital.  The data contain information on the 
kinds of groups that households belong to and the number of people that a household can run 
to for various matters (their social networks).  Because men and women may have different 
propensities to invest in social capital, we also analyze the determinants of group membership 
at the household and the individual levels.  The paper also examines the determinants of the 
density of social capital, proxied by the number of groups and the number of network 
members. Finally, it explores various reasons why people might join groups—whether groups 
increase trust, or whether groups increase well-being, as proxied by per capita expenditure. 
Bukidnon is a landlocked province in Northern Mindanao, comprising 20 
municipalities and two cities, Malaybalay and Valencia. Bukidnon has a land area of 829,378 
hectares, making it the largest province in Northern Mindanao and the eighth largest in the 
Philippines. The 2000 census reported that Bukidnon’s population was about 1,059,355—split 
about 70 percent to 30 percent between rural and urban areas based on the 1995 census—and 
had an average population density of 128 people per square kilometer. The national highway 
links Bukidnon to its neighboring provinces while the Sayre Highway links Bukidnon to 






del Sur and North Cotabato. Inter-provincial travel is mainly by bus while inter-municipality 
and barangay travel is by public utility vehicles.
3  Since Bukidnon is landlocked, it relies on 
Cagayan de Oro, the major metropolitan center in Northern Mindanao, as its nearest seaport.  
Figure 1 shows a map of the Philippines and the location of the study area.  
                                                      
3 The barangay is the smallest political unit in the Philippine government, and is similar to a village.  We use 
village and barangay interchangeably in this paper. 






Figure A1—Map of the Philippines, indicating study area 
 
 
The data used in this analysis draws from a survey of households conducted by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Research Institute for Mindanao 
Culture, Xavier University (RIMCU) in southern Bukidnon.  The original survey from which 
our sample is derived was designed to investigate the effects of agricultural 






Company (BUSCO) began operating a sugar mill in the area, which had previously been 
dominated by subsistence corn production.  The presence of the mill gave farmers the 
opportunity to adopt this cash crop, depending on their proximity to the mill.  The survey was 
fielded in four rounds at four–month intervals from August 1984 to December 1985, so that 
rounds one and four cover the same season.  The survey contains information on food and 
non-food consumption expenditure, agricultural production, income, asset ownership, credit 
use, anthropometry and morbidity, education and 24–hour food consumption recall.  The 
sample was drawn from 29 barangays and was stratified by (i) agricultural production 
activities, particularly sugar (the cash crop) and corn (the food crop), (ii) proximity to the 
sugar mill (as a proxy for access to the new crop), and (iii) access to land, including 
ownership, tenancy and landlessness.  The initial sample included 510 households, and 448 
households were interviewed in all four rounds.  Bouis and Haddad (1990) provide a detailed 
description of the sample design and survey area.  In 1992, 352 of the original 448 households 
were reinterviewed in a study focusing on adolescents (Bouis et al. 1998).  The 1992 survey 
included only one round of data collection and used a condensed survey instrument. 
Following qualitative studies conducted in the study communities in early 2003, IFPRI 
and RIMCU returned to conduct two rounds of quantitative data collection using a survey 
questionnaire that closely reflects the one used in 1984/85.  Both authors were involved in the 
design and pretesting of the 2003/2004 survey questionnaires.
4  In the first wave of data 
collection in the fall of 2003, all original respondents still living in the survey area were 
interviewed, as were up to two of their children (randomly selected) that formed households 
                                                      
4 We pretested the questionnaire in villages that were similar to the survey sites, but we avoided pretesting with 






in the survey area.  The first wave yielded 311 original respondents (61 percent of the original 
respondents) and 261 households formed by non-coresident children living in the same 
villages as their parents. The second wave of data collection began in April 2004 and ended in 
July 2004.  In this wave, the survey team interviewed any household formed by children who 
o longer live in the survey area, based on addresses and phone numbers provided by the 
original respondents and other family members.  This includes a large group of households in 
three major urban areas in Mindanao (Valencia, the commercial center of Bukidnon, 
Malaybalay, the provincial capital, and Cagayan de Oro in the province of Misamis Oriental, a 
major port and metropolitan area in northern Mindanao) as well as many households in peri–
urban and other rural areas of Bukidnon.  The sample size from the migrant wave consisted of 
257 households—about 75 percent of potential migrants to be interviewed.
 5  
Because we are interested in using information from 1984 as regressors in the 
equations for current participation in groups, in this paper we restrict the sample to those 
parents who were interviewed in 1984/85 and 2003.  We discuss our procedure for dealing 
with attrition bias below. 
There is no universally accepted definition of social capital.  The absence of consensus 
probably arises from our inability to observe social capital directly; instead we can only 
observe proxies for social capital.  Uphoff (2000) refers to groups and various types of 
                                                      
 
5 While budgetary concerns did not allow all children to be followed up, the survey was designed to obtain 
information on all children, regardless of location.  The initial interview with the parents obtained a basic set of 
information about all children, including location, educational attainment, and marital status.  Obtaining this 
information from parents, plus assiduous follow-up of migrants and children residing in the community, avoided 
the common problem of sample selection bias if interviews were based only on residence rules (Rosenzweig 






networks that contribute to cooperation as structural social capital as opposed to cognitive 
social capital that includes norms, values attitudes and beliefs.  Membership in groups can be 
referred to as institutional structural social capital and it is this dimension of social capital that 
we first investigate. 
The survey instrument includes a section on social capital that asks the household 
members to list all the groups, associations and cooperatives at least one household member 
belonged to.  For each group that the respondent names, he or she was asked which household 
member belonged to the group as well as several questions on group procedures and 
operations such as the number of group members, existence of a membership fee, availability 
of financial services, and homogeneity of group members.  In order to complement this 
information on structural social capital, the survey questionnaire also asked about the number 
of persons the household can run to in specific circumstances like an important economic loss 
or the need to look for information on prices or places to sell products.  The responses to these 
questions provide us with information on the size of different types of support networks that 
the household can depend on for information pooling (price, places to sell products, 
technology) and mutual assistance, both of which are usually associated with the returns to 
social capital. 
Households provided information on a total of 689 groups, which were classified into 
production, credit, burial, religious and civic groups.  Production groups include farmers’ 






cooperatives (41 percent of the credit groups),
6 rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs) (11 percent) referred to as paluwagan or hulugan and an arrangement called sosyo 
(49 percent).  Sosyos are informal credit associations to which members contribute money that 
they can lend out during the year at the market interest rate (5 to 10 percent monthly), usually 
to the group’s members.  The members divide the profits and capital among themselves in 
proportion to their contribution, typically before the town fiesta.  Some sosyos even require 
that the returns be used to finance group expenses related to the town fiesta.   
Similar to other parts of the world (Hoddinott et al. 2005), burial groups are 
associations where all the members contribute money or time to finance expenses related to 
the death of one of the members’ close relatives.  Civic groups are the most heterogeneous 
group category as they include not only women’s groups (56 percent), but also village youth 
associations (20 percent), school committees (12 percent), and village officials (12 percent).  
Table 1 provides information on the prevalence of these types of groups.   
                                                      





Table 1—Membership in groups, by type of group and 1984 asset quartile 
 
Type of group 




with at least 
one member 
(#) 
Maximum # of 
groups of this type 
to which a 
household belonged 
% households 
from 1st asset 
quartile with 









from 3rd asset 
quartile with 
≥ 1 member 
% households 
from 4th asset 
quartile with 
≥ 1 member 
Production group  20.2  26.7 (83) 2  7.7  19.2  34.6  45.4 
Credit group  17.7  21.5 (67)  3  12.8  17.9  33.3  22.1 
Burial group  21.8  31.5 (98)  3  29.5  29.5  37.2  29.9 
Religious group  29.8  33.4 (104) 5  32.0  33.3  32.0  36.4 





Religious groups are the most frequently mentioned groups, corresponding to 30 percent of 
the entire list of groups and with 33 percent of the households belonging to at least one group. 
This might be explained by the diversity of religious groups in the rural Philippines.  One 
household even had members in five different such groups.  The largest religious group is the 
parish community (55 percent); other religious groups include the Knights of Columbus, 
Couples for Christ and others. Civic groups are the least common type of group, representing 
11 percent of the groups mentioned and with 14 percent of the households belonging to at 
least one group.  Household participation in religious and burial groups is about the same 
across asset quartiles but Table 1 also shows that participation in production, credit and civic 
groups is clearly increasing with asset quartile.
7 This first look at group membership 
highlights that the types of groups households belong to are quite diversified compared to 
other countries where the most important groups are village women’s and/or men’s group that 
cater to diversified activities (like in Senegal or in Kenya (Kariuki and Place, 2005)). 
Households belong to an average of 1.6 groups, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 11 (Table 2).   
Table 2—Group density, by 1984 asset quartile 












Mean 1.6  1.1  1.3  1.8  2.1 
Standard deviation  1.5  1.2  1.1  1.5  1.9 
Maximum (minimum 
always 0)  11  5  5  7  11 
 
                                                      
7 The data correspond to 311 households so there are 78 households in the first three asset quartiles and 79 in the 





Both the average number and the maximum number of groups to which the household 
belongs increase steadily with the asset quartile.  Respondents were also asked which 
household member belonged to the group.  A special code was used when the whole family 
itself was considered a member of the group.  Table 3 indicates who in the household belongs 
to the group when the group is not the whole family itself.  
 




Most of the individual group members are either the household head or spouse (94 percent); 
this justifies our restricting the analysis of participation by gender to heads and spouses, 
considering that both of them participate when the whole family is considered a group 
member. 
   Times cited  Percentage 
HH Head  360  49.7 
Spouse 318  43.9 
Son 23  3.2 
Daughter 14  1.9 
Son-in-law 3  0.4 
Daughter-in-law 1  0.1 
Granddaughter 2  0.3 
Other relation of HH Head  4  0.6 





Table 4 presents the percentage of households across asset quartiles that do not have 
any members participating in groups.   
Table 4—Absence of participation in any group, by 1984 asset quartile 
 
 
As expected, the asset poor are less likely to participate in groups.  This finding holds for both 
men and women, but the non- participation rate is on average higher for women than for men.  
We provide the correlations between household level participation in different types of groups 
in Table 5.  None of these correlations is higher than 0.5 and when we consider participation 
in different types of groups, the highest correlation is only 0.16.
  % households not participating  % males not 
participating 
% females not 
participating 
All households  24.1  36.8  41.3 
1
stasset 
quartile 34.6  46.5  50.7 
2
nd asset 
quartile  24.4 40.9  41.0 
3
rd asset 
quartile 19.2  34.3  32.4 
4
th asset 





Table 5—Correlation matrix of participation in different types of groups 
  Any group  Production group  Credit group  Burial group  Religious 
group  Civic group 
Any group  1           
Production 
group 0.34**  1         
Credit group  0.30**  -0.07  1       
Burial group  0.38**  0.00  0.15**  1     
Religious 
group 0.40**  -0.04  0.01  0.11*  1   









Table 6 provides some details on the operations of the different groups.  Group sizes 
are quite varied, ranging from four up to 10,000 members.   
Table 6—Group operations and procedures, by type of group 
 
 
Production groups have the largest average number of group members.  Sugar producers (36 
percent of our sample households are growing some sugar) have to be members of one out of 
four sugar growers’ associations because the sugar mill buys sugar cane only through these 
  Production group  Credit group  Burial group  Religious group  Civic group 
Number of group members       
Mean 1018  142  86  157  105 
Minimum  7 4  13  7 4 
Maximum 7200  4000  230  3000  10000
Percent requiring 
membership  fee  55% 82%  86%  22% 24% 
Mean value of 
membership fee 
when required 
(2003 pesos)  460 455  75  85  37 
Percentage of 
groups with:         
Financial 
services 62%  84%  5%  6%  22% 
Single-sex 
membership  6% 5%  2%  13%  58% 
Similar age  11%  22%  6%  12%  12% 
Similar  incomes  21% 40%  28%  36% 44% 
Similar 





associations.  Burial groups are the smallest in terms of average and maximum size but also 
have the highest minimum number of members (13), as there is no benefit to spreading burial 
costs across a too small number of households.  Burial groups are quite informal in contrast to 
the other types of groups that are organized as cooperatives or larger federations, which may 
be why we do not observe burial groups of more than 230 members. 
Credit and burial groups are more likely to ask for an initial fee (more than 80 percent 
of these groups do so) but this is also a common practice in production groups (55 percent). 
The average size of this fee is higher for production and credit groups (a little more than 450 
pesos
8 compared to less than 90 pesos for other groups).  Most of the production (62 percent) 
and credit groups (84 percent) provide the household with financial (credit or savings) 
services.  In the few cases in which sosyos and ROSCAS did not provide credit or a specific 
credit product (9 out of the 37 sosyos and 2 out of the 6 ROSCAs), contributions to these 
groups can be considered a form of forced savings since the household cannot withdraw its 
money at will. 
Finally, we examine group homogeneity with respect to member characteristics.  Table 
6 shows that participating in mixed-gender groups is not an issue in the Philippines. The high 
proportion of civic groups that is single-sex (58 percent) is accounted for by the high 
proportion of women’s groups (56 percent of civic groups are women’s groups).  Women’s 
group activities are geared towards nutrition and other interests (e.g. cooking); the wife of the 
village representative (if he is male and married) or the village representative herself (if she is 
female) usually heads the group.  Groups also attract members from very different age ranges, 
                                                      





even burial groups. Groups are usually more homogeneous in terms of income (especially for 
credit and civic groups) and occupation (especially for credit and production groups). 
We did not collect information on whether groups were ‘self-formed’ by the 
constituents or driven by development projects. This could however have direct implications 
on group participation if development projects target men and more literate persons more 
often. See Agarwal (2001) for a description of how externally supported initiatives have 
exacerbated existing inequities between rich and poor, and men and women).  It is unlikely, 
however, that development initiatives would systematically target men rather than women, 
given the Philippines’ relatively egalitarian society.  Rather, it is more likely that some 
initiatives would be targeted to men, particularly those related to production, while others 
would be targeted to women. 
Although the quality and type of participation in groups can vary widely, we did not 
collect information on these aspects of participation. Similar to other economic studies, we 
will restrict our measure of group membership to actual participation in groups and number of 
groups the household belongs to (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Maluccio et al. 2000; Haddad 
and Maluccio, 2003).  A major drawback of this approach is its inability to take into account 
both the different roles that men or women may take within these groups and the gender 
dynamics within the groups.  To some extent, we are able to analyze some aspects of the 
gendered participation in groups because we know the type of group to which individuals 
belong.  As we show later on, there are significant differences in the type of group to which 
men and women belong, even if there is no significant overall difference between men and 





Aside from information on groups to which the household belongs, we also asked the 
household about the number of persons it can run to for help on specific occasions.  These 
networks can be classified as private structural capital while the corresponding events 
mobilize different aspects of social capital, such as trust, mutual insurance, information-
pooling or copying.  All of these questions were designed in consultation with Filipino 
researchers and field staff who are familiar with the local culture, and who advised us 
regarding the appropriate questions and wording. Trust-related questions deal with care of the 
house, care of children, and family problems.  The wording of these questions is as follows: 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES 
The Bukidnon panel survey 
Measures of social capital 
Membership in groups 
Social and economic networks 
•  Care of the house: If you had to leave for a week with all your household members, 
how many persons would you ask to look after your house for you? 
•  Care of children: In an emergency, how many persons could you leave your young 
children with? 
•  Family problem: If you had a family problem (like early pregnancy in the family), 
how many persons could you confide in and discuss with? 
•  Questions related to mutual insurance, information pooling or copying, and those 
pertaining to economic networks deal with economic loss, price and technology, and 





•  Economic loss: How many persons do you think would help you if you suffered an 
important economic loss (like a fire, severe illness of a household member or loss of 
harvest)? 
•  Price: How many persons can you consult when you need information on prices or on 
a place to sell your products? 
•  Technology:  How many persons would you follow if they had adopted a new 
production technology? 
 
All of these questions are hypothetical and it is likely that households that have 
already experienced similar situations will provide more accurate responses.  To reduce 
problems of response bias, we restricted the analysis of these questions to a subsample of 
households that are more likely to have confronted the corresponding problem.  For example, 
the subsample for analyzing the network for child care consists of  households with at least 
one child under 15; the network for price comprises households engaged in agricultural or non 
agricultural production; and the network for technology is formed by households engaged in 
agricultural production.   
Table 7 presents the average and median number of persons in the different networks 
corresponding to the relevant subsamples as well as the percentage of households reporting no 
persons in their network.  This table also includes the average number of persons in different 
networks for households across asset quartiles and with membership in different groups.   





Table 7—Characteristics of social and economic networks 











Network: Price  Network: 
Technology 
Mean  1.8 1.7  2.4 3.4 2.4 1.8 
Standard 
deviation  1.3 0.9  2.4 3.2 2.4 1.2 
Median  2 2  2 2 2 1 
Households 
reporting  0  (%)  4.2 4.9  1.3 0.7 1.2 0.9 
Maximum 
(minimum 
always  0)  10  4  20 20 20 10 
Social networks, by 1984 asset quartiles        
First asset 
quartile  1.68 1.58  1.97 3.04 1.98 1.69 
Second asset 
quartile  1.65 1.58  2.17 2.96 2.20 1.67 
Third asset 
quartile    1.87 1.83  2.69 3.22 2.25 1.71 
Fourth asset   2.10  1.65  2.91 4.42 3.03 2.03 
Social networks and group membership        
At least one 
group 
1.92  **  1.70 2.71  ***  3.62  **  2.54  **  1.83 
Production 
group  1.87 1.76  2.32  *  3.93  **  2.37 1.95 
Credit group 
2.06 **  1.84  *  3.25 ***  3.73  2.86  *  1.86 





Table 7—Characteristics of social and economic networks (continued) 











Network: Price  Network: 
Technology 
Religious 
group  1.96 1.83  *  2.51 3.26 2.25 1.80 
Civic group 
2.31 ***  1.79  2.76    2.89  3.03  **  2.10 
Network samples: all households for care of house, family problem and economic loss;       
households with at least one child below 15 for care of children; households engaged in agricultural production for 
technology    
households operating a non agricultural business or engaged in agricultural production 
for price      
* indicates that the mean is significantly higher for the households participating in the group at the 10% level, ** at 5% and 





On average, the number of persons households can run to in case of important 
economic loss is larger than for the other scenarios.  The network with both the lowest 
average number and the lowest maximum number of persons the household can run to is the 
network related to childcare.  The percentage of households reporting that they have no one to 
run to for any of the different occasions (care of house, care of children, economic loss, price 
and technology) is relatively low (only 0.7 percent for the network related to economic loss9) 
but the median number of persons in the network is also low (two persons for most of the 
networks).  The average network size households rely on for different types of assistance is 
larger for households from higher asset quartiles except for the child care network.  
Households that participate in at least one group know on average more people that they can 
run to; this difference is significant for networks related to care of the house, family problems, 
economic loss and price, but not for networks related to child care and technology. 
Households belonging to burial groups do not seem to know more people, as the difference in 
the network size between the households that participate in burial groups and the ones that do 
not is never significant.  Households who belong to religious groups have significantly larger 
networks for care of the house and care of children but not for economic oriented networks.  
Membership in production groups is the only type of group membership that is associated 
with a significantly higher network size for economic loss.  While it might seem that 
membership in groups increases the size of one’s networks,10 these differences in means
                                                      
9 Asking a similar question in rural Ethiopia, Hoddinott et al. (2005) found that 9 percent of their sample 
households had nobody to run to in case of economic failure but that the median number of people in the 
household’s network is five. 
10 Group membership can both increase the size of one’s network and be facilitated by one’s network if for 
example members of networks have better access to information or if membership in one group is restricted to 





might also arise from characteristics of households that also affect their propensity to join 
groups.  Thus, in the next section, we investigate the determinants of membership in groups 
and networks, controlling for individual, household, and community characteristics. 
DETERMINANTS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Empirical specification 
Household level group membership 
We hypothesize that, at the household level, the probability of joining a group in 2003 
is a function of household characteristics, namely: human capital of the household head, 
household demographics, the household’s position in the asset distribution, the composition of 
the household’s asset portfolio, its production status, religion, length of time in the 
community, its exposure to shocks, and distance to facilities, as well as village-level 
characteristics.  These village-level characteristics are village-level measures of heterogeneity, 
presence of cooperatives, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government programs 
in the community, and the peace and order situation in the community.  Means and standard 
deviations of the variables used in the group membership regressions are found in Appendix 
Table 1. 
Indicators of human capital of the household head are age and age squared in 2003, 
whether the household head completed elementary education (six years or more of schooling) 





include household size and the proportion of household members in different age categories.
11  
Because we are interested in the role of asset inequality in the accumulation of social capital, 
we use a number of asset measures.  Since decisions regarding the accumulation of assets and 
decisions to join groups may be made simultaneously, we use indicators of past asset position, 
using the 1984 data.  We include dummy variables for the household’s asset quartile in 1984 
(the highest quartile is the excluded category).  Since it is possible that the composition of the 
asset portfolio affects the accumulation of other forms of (social) assets, we include as 
regressors the proportions of the household’s assets held in land, productive assets, and 
livestock.  The excluded category consists of housing and consumer durables.  We also 
include a dummy variable indicating whether the household is a sugar producer, whether it is 
an agricultural household, or whether it is a nonagricultural household (the excluded category 
derives its income exclusively from wages and consists mainly of landless households).
12  We 
include a dummy variable for whether the household head is Catholic (the majority religious 
denomination).  The duration of residence in the community proxies the household’s 
connectedness to the community, given that 83 percent of household heads are migrants to 
Bukidnon.
13  To test whether exposure to unfortunate events increases the likelihood of 
joining groups, we include the cumulative number (count) of shocks reported from 1984 to 
2001. 
                                                      
11 While we could also have disaggregated demographic categories by sex, we wanted to conserve degrees of 
freedom.  Moreover, disaggregating by sex may not be too important in the Philippine setting, where 
intrahousehold allocation tends to be relatively egalitarian, at least with respect to expenditure shares 
(Quisumbing et al.  2004).   
 
12 Some households are engaged in both agricultural and nonagricultural production and the corresponding 
dummies are therefore not exclusive. 
13 However, the households in the 2003 sample have lived continuously in the community since 1984. 





Measures of distance to facilities include: (1) road distance to the town center or 
poblacion in 1984; (2) travel time to the nearest hospital; and (3) road distance from the 
barangay center to the nearest sugar mill.
14  The first and second distance measures are at the 
household level; the third is at the village level. We employ a number of measures of village-
level heterogeneity, following Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) and Haddad and Maluccio 
(2003).  Our measures of heterogeneity are:  (1) heterogeneity with respect to region of origin, 
henceforth origin heterogeneity; (2) asset heterogeneity; (3) heterogeneity with respect to 
ethnicity of the household head, henceforth ethnic heterogeneity; and (4) educational 
heterogeneity (based on the education of the household head).  The first and third measures 
are based on categorical variables and are computed as follows: 
Heterogeneity measurei = 1 – ∑s
2
ki 
where i represents a village and k the different regions of origin or ethnic groups, depending 
on whether origin heterogeneity or ethnic heterogeneity is being measured.  The second and 
fourth heterogeneity measures use the standard deviations of the 1984 value of assets and 
years of schooling of the household head as proxies for asset and educational heterogeneity, 
respectively.  We also include a measure for the intensity of peace and order problems in the 
village, which is relevant since incidents of armed conflict are common in Mindanao up to the 
present.  This measure is computed using community level data and is the sum of the 
percentage of households affected by peace and order problems each year since 1984.  Finally, 
we hypothesize that households will be better able to participate in groups if there are existing 
groups in the community.  We use the numbers of cooperatives, NGO programs, and 
                                                      
14 A new sugar mill, Crystal Sugar Mill, has been operating in the area since 1998 and is situated in the 





government programs in the community in 2000-2001 mentioned in community level data to 
capture the range of activities in which households can participate. 
 
Attrition and selectivity 
Because the 2003 survey was conducted 19 years after the first survey round in 1984, 
we expect that some households would have left the sample, whether due to death, migration, 
or refusal to be interviewed.  While a complete attrition analysis is outside the scope of this 
paper (see McNiven and Gilligan 2005), we need to control for attrition if the factors that lead 
households to leave the sample create biases in our estimates of the determinants of social 
capital.  We control for attrition by accounting for the probability that the household is 
reinterviewed in 2003 in our analysis; this is, of course, the mirror image of attrition from the 
sample.  We posit that the reinterview probability is a function of the household head’s age, 
age squared, years of schooling, position in the asset distribution, the portfolio composition of 
assets, the share of household members of working age, the share of female working age 
members, the number of working age members, distance from the household (in 1984) to the 
town center and the sugar mill, travel time to the nearest hospital (in 1984), and village-
specific attributes such as the percentage of other households interviewed in the village 
between 1984/85 and 2003, and the percentage increase in the number of households in the 
village between 1980 and 2000.  Means and standard deviations of these variables are found 
in Appendix Table 2. 
Individual group membership 
Because men and women may have different preferences regarding group 





group participation by: (1) estimating a pooled regression on the total number of groups and 
the probability of participating in different types of groups with a dummy variable for being 
female; and (2) estimate regressions for the total number of groups and participation in 
specific groups separately for males and females.  Since the household head and spouse 
represent 94 percent of the persons specifically mentioned as the group member, we use the 
sample of heads and spouses for the analysis of individual group membership.  Household 
level attrition is corrected in these analyses for the absence of husband or wife in some 
households.  Age, age squared and schooling variables now refer to the husband or wife; other 
household and village-level variables remain the same. 
Determinants of group membership at the household level 
Table 8 examines the probability of participating in at least one group, production 
groups, and credit groups, while Table 9 presents similar regressions for burial, religious, and 
civic groups using a probit model with sample section (Heckman 1979; Van de Ven and Van 





Table 8— Household membership in at least one group, production and credit groups:  
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
 
At least one 
group Production group Credit group
   Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
           
Age of head in 2003  -0.153  -0.98  -0.337  -2.20  0.238 1.44 
Age of head in 2003, squared  0.002  1.09  0.003  2.31  -0.002 -1.32 
Elementary education: Head has 6 years of schooling or 
more  0.304  1.43  0.104 0.41 0.144 0.60 
High school education: head has 10 years of schooling 
or more  1.307  2.93  1.104  3.31  -0.119 -0.44 
Household  size  in  2003  0.136  1.46  -0.081 -1.16 -0.022 -0.40 
Percentage of household members in 2003:           
Aged  0  to  14  0.913  1.25  0.592 0.67 0.700 0.84 
Aged  15  to  19  0.735  0.84  -0.276 -0.29 -0.694 -0.77 
Aged 35 to 54  1.949  1.80  0.052 0.05 1.284 1.21 
Aged 55 and over  1.841  1.65  -0.137  -0.15 0.152 0.18 





Table 8— Household membership in at least one group, production and credit groups (continued):  
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
 
At least one 
group Production group Credit group
   Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
Lowest asset quartile  -0.387  -0.85  -1.371  -2.11  -0.032 -0.04 
Second asset quartile  -0.087  -0.25  -1.229  -3.13  -0.027 -0.05 
Third asset quartile  -0.123  -0.38  -1.071  -3.40  -0.064 -0.21 
Proportion of asset in total asset value in 1984 x 100; housing and consumer durables excluded 
Land  -0.003  -0.60  0.006 1.02 0.001 0.33 
Productive  assets  -0.006  -0.92  0.008 0.90 0.002 0.17 
Livestock  -0.009  -1.40  0.009  1.01 -0.004 -0.57 
Dummies for type of household in 2003           
Sugar producing household   0.039  0.15  1.134  4.09  0.180 0.75 
Agricultural producer household  -0.074  -0.25  0.672  2.07  0.039 0.17 
Nonagricultural producer household  0.227  0.93  0.438  1.74  -0.062 -0.27 
Other household characteristics           





Table 8— Household membership in at least one group, production and credit groups (continued):  
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
Years present in community  0.006  0.56  -0.011  -0.79  -0.018  -1.29 
Number  of  shocks    0.111  1.31  0.011 0.13 0.146 1.18 
Distance from household            
Distance to town center (kilometers)  -0.135  -3.83  -0.025 -0.58 -0.163 -2.83 
Travel time to nearest hospital in 1984 (minutes)  0.000  0.16  -0.003  -1.02  0.001  0.46 
Distance to nearest sugar mill (kilometers)  -0.003  -0.20  -0.020  -1.12  -0.024  -1.10 
Indices of barangay heterogeneity           
Region of origin of the household head  1.180  1.19  2.624  2.14  1.625 0.74 
Asset heterogeneity (1984 household assets)  0.000  -0.78  0.000  -1.18  0.000  2.32 
Ethnicity of the household head   -1.844  -2.83  -0.860 -1.23 -1.948 -1.48 
Education of the household head  -0.088  -1.23  -0.073  -0.79  -0.217  -2.94 
Percentage of households affected by peace and 
order problems since 1984  0.000  0.13  0.006  2.40  -0.002 -1.17 
Programs operating in barangay, 2000-2001           
Cooperatives -0.831  -3.59  -0.110 -0.39 -0.774 -1.98 





Table 8— Household membership in at least one group, production and credit groups (continued):  
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
Government programs  0.256  1.70  0.138 0.83 0.475 1.65 
Constant 4.422  0.94  8.219  1.70  -5.455 -0.95 
           
Number  of  observations  509    509   509  
Censored  observations  198    198   198  
Uncensored  observations  311    311   311  
Wald  test  (chi-square)  72.47    80.06   59.49  
p-value  0.00    0.00   0.00  
           
Wald test of independent equations (chi-square)  5.04    0.00    0.41   
p-value  0.02     0.97     0.52    
  z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better  
Selection correction includes age and age squared of household head in 1984, years of schooling of the head in 1984,asset quartiles in 1984, 
proportion of assets held in land, productive assets, and livestock, share of household members in various demographic categories, household 
distance from village center, sugar mill, travel time in minutes to the nearest hospital percentage of other households interviewed in the village in 





Table 9— Household membership in burial, religious, and civic groups: 
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
  Burial group Religious group  Civic group 
   Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
    
Age of head in 2003  -0.122 -0.83 -0.004  -0.03 -0.200  -1.02
Age of head in 2003, squared  0.001 0.81 0.000  0.20 0.002  1.06
Elementary education: Head has 6 years of 
schooling or more  -0.029 -0.12 -0.208  -1.04 0.033  0.15
High school education: head has 10 years of 
schooling or more  -0.367 -1.02 0.499  0.61 0.507  1.27
Household size in 2003  0.101 1.78 0.035 0.48 0.034 0.69
Percentage of household members in 2003:    
Aged 0 to 14  0.632 0.83 0.426  0.48 0.041  0.06
Aged 15 to 19  -0.099 -0.11 -0.339  -0.44 -2.032  -1.28
Aged 35 to 54  1.672 1.85 1.134 0.71 -0.554  -0.75
Aged 55 and over  1.291 1.43 -0.103  -0.11 -0.389  -0.44
Asset quartile (in 1984; highest quartile 





Table 9— Household membership in burial, religious, and civic groups (continued): 
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
  Burial group  Religious group  Civic group 
   Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
Lowest asset quartile  -0.621 -1.24 -0.218  -0.21 0.184  0.28
Second asset quartile  -0.728 -1.95 0.219 0.52 0.533 1.67
Third asset quartile  -0.495 -1.61 -0.143  -0.28 -0.537  -0.98
Proportion of asset in total asset value in 1984 
x 100; housing and consumer durables 
excluded      
Land -0.009 -1.79 -0.006 -0.67 0.003  0.59
Productive assets  -0.029 -2.59 0.002 0.09 0.002 0.28
Livestock -0.004 -0.47 -0.022  -2.78 -0.013 -1.44
Dummies for type of household in 2003      
Sugar producing household   -0.268 -0.98 0.246  0.84 -0.384  -1.16
Agricultural producer household  0.411 1.56 -0.248  -1.10 0.240  1.06
Nonagricultural producer household  -0.572 -2.41 0.048 0.24 -0.029  -0.14
Other household characteristics      
Household head is Catholic   1.543 3.49 0.287 0.79 -0.554  -0.94





Table 9— Household membership in burial, religious, and civic groups (continued): 
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
  Burial group  Religious group  Civic group 
   Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
Number of shocks   -0.084 -1.13 0.068  0.87 -0.047  -0.50
Distance from household       
Distance to town center (kilometers)  -0.075 -1.83 -0.113  -2.48 -0.103  -2.19
Travel time to nearest hospital in 1984 
(minutes)  0.002 0.68 -0.003 -1.60 -0.006 -1.63
Distance to nearest sugar mill (kilometers)  0.006 0.39 0.013  0.65 -0.016  -1.02
Indices of barangay heterogeneity      
Region of origin of the household head  4.076 3.28 -0.418 -0.38 -1.351 -0.83
Asset heterogeneity (1984 household assets) 0.000 -0.66 0.000  -0.83 0.000  0.68
Ethnicity of the household head   -3.074 -4.87 -0.817 -0.51 1.270  1.20
Education of the household head  -0.086 -1.18 0.196  0.76 -0.054  -0.81
Percentage of households affected by peace 
and order problems since 1984  0.008 3.23 0.003 0.92 0.000 0.11
Programs operating in barangay, 2000-2001      
Cooperatives -0.931 -3.24 0.001 0.00 -0.532  -1.11





Table 9— Household membership in burial, religious, and civic groups (continued): 
probit regressions with selection correction for the probability of being reinterviewed in 2003 
Specification with sampling weights and robust standard errors 
Dependent variable:  Household has at least one person who is a member of a group 
  Burial group  Religious group  Civic group 
   Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z
Government programs  0.080 0.47 -0.006 -0.03 -0.038 -0.21
Constant 1.967 0.43 -1.028 0.19 7.513 1.13
      
Number of observations  509 509   509
Censored observations  198 198   198
Uncensored observations  311 311   311
      
Wald test (chi-square)  114.99 67.98   43.77
p-value 0.00 0.00   0.08
      
Wald test of independent equations (chi-
square)  1.38 0.06  0.73
p-value 0.24   0.81     0.39  
z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better  
Selection correction includes age and age squared of household head in 1984, years of schooling of the head in 1984, asset quartiles in 1984, proportion of assets 
held in land, productive assets, and livestock, share of household members in various demographic categories, household distance from village center, sugar mill, 
travel time in minutes to the nearest hospital percentage of other households interviewed in the village in 1984/85 and 2003, and the percentage increase in the 





The selectivity correction controls for sample attrition between 1984 and 2003, while 
the probits were estimated with robust standard errors and sampling weights to take into 
account survey design.  As the Wald tests for independence of equations indicate, correction 
for selection bias was necessary for estimating the determinants of membership in at least one 
group but not when estimating the determinants of membership in a specific type of group.  
The results highlight the differences in the impact of asset and heterogeneity measures on 
membership in different types of groups. 
Membership in production groups 
Life cycle effects are significant determinants of participation in production groups.  
Households with more human capital--households with a head having completed at least 10 
years of schooling-- are more likely to take part in productive groups. After controlling for 
productive activity and portfolio composition, wealthier households are more likely to take 
part in productive groups, as reflected by the negative sign of the three first asset quartiles in 
the third column of Table 8.  There are alternative explanations for this result.  Better- 
educated and wealthier households may have a higher demand for group membership because 
they can more easily benefit from their positive externalities. A less optimistic interpretation 
would be the existence of barriers to participation of the asset- and education-poor 
households.  However, portfolio composition has no impact on membership in productive 
groups.  Not surprisingly, households engaged in agricultural or non agricultural production 
are more likely to be members of productive groups and the impact of being an agricultural 
producer is larger.  Being a sugar producer increases the probability of membership in 





Interestingly, village level heterogeneity in terms of the origin of the household head has a 
positive impact on membership in productive groups.  Production techniques might vary in 
different parts of the Philippines and there might be more incentive to join production groups 
in villages where there is “more to learn” from other members.  Political unrest also had a 
positive impact on membership in productive groups. 
Membership in credit groups 
The household’s demographics, its productive activity, position in the asset 
distribution, and portfolio composition are not relevant in explaining the household’s 
membership in credit groups.  Indeed, distance to the town center is the only significant 
household-level variable in this regression.  Since markets and commercial establishments are 
located in the town center, it is the main place where goods are exchanged and is therefore 
more monetized.  The lack of significance of other household characteristics indicates that 
credit transactions are not limited to well-off households, owing to the existence of an active 
informal credit market.  Indeed, 69 percent of the survey households incurred at least one loan 
during the year preceding the survey (Godquin and Sharma 2004).  Village asset heterogeneity 
has a positive impact on membership in credit groups, reflecting the conjunction of 
households being able to lend out money and households interested in borrowing money.  
Educational heterogeneity of the village has a negative impact on membership in credit 
groups; it is possible that having a similar level of education is a precondition for being able 
to rely on other group members to manage money together.  While one could hypothesize that 
households would be more likely to participate in groups in villages with more cooperatives, 





find the opposite effect.  Perhaps the high number of cooperatives operating in the village is a 
signal of coordination difficulties for households in cooperating and forming large groups.  It 
could also indicate that cooperatives are being formed for political purposes, as the 
cooperatives movement in the Philippines has risen and fallen depending on support from 
elected officials.
15  Further qualitative research should be conducted to understand this 
negative impact of the number of cooperatives operating in the village. 
Membership in burial groups 
Larger households are more likely to participate in burial groups.  Since the 
contribution to these groups is not based on the number of household members, households 
with more members to insure find it more advantageous to join.  Households with more 
members above 35 are also more likely to join burial groups, because the probability of death 
increases with age.  The productive activity of the household influences significantly 
membership in burial groups.  Households engaged in agricultural activities are more likely to 
be members of burial groups whereas households engaged in non agricultural business are 
less likely to join such groups.
16  Membership in burial groups mitigates lumpy expenditures 
in case of death.  This type of insurance might be more valuable for households with seasonal 
income, such as those engaged in agriculture.  Households that own a larger share of their 
assets in land or productive assets (livestock excluded) are less likely to participate in burial 
                                                      
15 Cooperatives were encouraged during the Marcos regime, for example, especially for agrarian reform 
beneficiaries.  Many of these cooperatives fell into disarray in subsequent years.  The cooperatives movement 
paled in comparison to the rise of NGOs during the Aquino administration, but seems to have recovered with 
support from the Ramos administration. 
16 Households can be engaged in both agricultural production and non agricultural business (64 of the 311 survey 
households) and can also be engaged in neither of them when none of its household member is self employed (57 





groups.  Catholics are more likely to take part in burial groups. Death is also a religious event 
and it is easier for households from the major religious group (92 percent are Catholic) to find 
a large number of other households of the same religion that participate or could participate in 
a burial group.  Distance from the household to the village center reduces the probability of 
joining a burial group. Remote households may incur higher costs in participating in burial 
groups if such groups are closely related to churches, which are usually situated in the village 
center. 
Village origin heterogeneity positively influences the participation in burial groups; 
villages with higher origin heterogeneity are villages with more migrants from outside 
Bukidnon who may have smaller family networks within the village or within Bukidnon 
itself.  If family networks are an important source of support (both financial and labor) when a 
death occurs, origin heterogeneity will increase the number of households interested in taking 
part in burial groups.  Village ethnic heterogeneity has the opposite effect, probably because it 
is difficult for households from different ethnic groups to cooperate together.  Burial groups 
and cooperatives seem to be partial substitutes: where a lot of cooperatives operate, 
membership in burial groups is less likely, perhaps because some cooperatives offer the same 
services as burial groups (some cooperatives have death benefits, for example).  A higher 
incidence of peace and order problems increases the likelihood of joining burial groups.  Even 
if peace and order problems do not directly affect the mortality rate of the village, they can 





Membership in religious and civic groups 
Compared to production, credit or burial groups, religious and civic groups do not 
focus on economic motives, which may account for the low significance of our explanatory 
variables.  Distance to the town center, which also proxies distance to church and civic 
oriented activities, is negatively associated with membership in both religious and civic 
groups.  Households that own a larger share of their assets in livestock are less likely to join 
religious groups. Households from the second asset quartile are more likely to join civic 
groups. 
Membership in any group 
More than three-quarters of the households (76 percent) are members of at least one 
group.  However, this relatively high figure is not driven by membership in a specific type of 
group: membership in religious groups is the most frequent type of membership, with 33 
percent of the households being members of such a group.  Examining the determinants of 
participation in any group helps us understand the households who are not connected to any 
group—and who might therefore be “socially excluded” from group activity.  Education plays 
an important role in group membership, with better-educated households having a higher 
probability of joining groups.  It is however unclear whether households with higher 
education benefit more from group membership and are therefore more willing to participate 
in groups, or whether households have the same willingness to participate in groups, but less 
educated households face more difficulties in joining these groups.  Except for youth groups 
(here included in civic groups) and religious groups, the household head and spouse or other 





explain why households with a higher share of adults over 35 are more likely to participate in 
groups.  Households farther away from the town center are less likely to be members of 
groups, which might be related to the greater difficulty of attending meetings (54 percent of 
the groups mentioned in the survey hold meetings at least once a month).  The number of 
cooperatives operating in the village has a negative impact on membership in any group, 
while the number of government programs operating in the village has the opposite effect.  
This effect seems to be driven by the positive impact of government programs on membership 
in credit and production groups. 
How does gender affect group membership? 
 
While households belong to groups, the activities associated with group membership 
are the responsibility of specific household members.  When group membership is considered 
on an individual basis, the household head and spouse account for 94 percent of group 
members.  In order to investigate whether gender matters for group membership, we focus our 
analysis on group membership of household heads and spouses.
17 
Participation in various groups, by sex  
 
Table 10 reports the proportion of household heads and spouses participating in the 
different type of groups, by sex. Tests of equality of means of group membership by sex 
                                                      
17 We therefore have two observations per household, one for the male head and one for the female head or 
spouse. However when no male (or alternatively female) head is present in the household (because of death for 
example), only one observation per household was retained for the corresponding households (34 households 
had no male head or spouse; eight households had no female head or spouse). 





indicate that group membership significantly differs by gender for production, burial and civic 
groups.  
Table 10— Membership in groups, by sex 
  
% of males 
participating in 
groups 




significance of the 
difference 
Membership in any 
group  63.2% 58.7%  not  significant 
Production group  22.4%  14.5%  1% 
Credit group  11.2%  14.2%  not significant 
Burial group  31.4%  23.4%  5% 
Religious group  29.6%  31.0%  not significant 
Civic group  4.3%  10.6%  1% 
 
 
Males have a higher probability of participating in production groups than females (31 percent 
compared to 23 percent); males are also more likely to join burial groups (31 percent vs. 23 
percent).  In contrast, 11 percent of female heads or spouses are members of civic groups, 
compared to 4 percent for males.  This is because most civic groups in the study area (55 
percent) are women’s groups and there are no exclusively male groups.   
In order to investigate whether these differences in means persist once we control for 
individual, household, and village level factors, we estimate—at the level of household head 
and spouse—the probit model presented in section 3 with the addition of a sex dummy. 





groups, but the differences show up in the type of groups to which husbands and wives belong 
(Table 11).  
 














Concluding that men and women participate equally in groups, without distinguishing 
among types of groups, would mask gender differences in group participation.  For example, 
males are more likely to be members of production groups, while females are more likely to 
participate in civic groups.  This may indicate a division of labor within the household, or 
separate spheres of decision making.  Men are indeed more involved in groups related to 
income generation and the public sphere whereas women are more involved in home and 
  Coefficient z  p-value for selection correction 
Probability of participating in groups (Heckman selection model) 
All groups  -0.144 -0.97   0.05   
Production -0.420 -2.31  0.96   
Credit 0.230 1.32   0.37   
Burial -0.284 -1.61   0.38   
Religious 0.167 1.08   0.72   
Civic 0.477 2.06  0.28   
Number of 
groups        
Tobit -0.025 -0.18      
Ordered probit  -0.026 -0.27        





child related groups corresponding to the private sphere. In addition to differences in the 
groups men and women join, further gender differences that we did not capture might exist in 
the roles men and women assume in groups. 
Factors explaining membership in groups 
Individual, household, and village characteristics also affect men’s and women’s group 
membership in different ways.  Tables 12 and 13 present the regression results of the 
probability of participating in different types of groups by sex.18 
                                                      
18 We did not report the results of membership in civic groups for males as there were too few males (12 out of 
277) participating in such groups to produce relevant results. We will therefore compare female membership 

































  Regressions on the probability of participating in at least one group, production, and 
credit groups are found in Table 12; those for burial, religious, and civic groups are in Table 
13.  As the tables show, some of the factors explaining group membership at the household 
level such as the presence of cooperatives operating in the village affect male and female 
group membership in the same way, but others have a differential effect by gender.  The 
following discussion will focus on differences across gender in the impact of the regressors. 
The results confirm that high school education is a very important predictor of group 
membership in at least one group and production groups for both males and females (Table 
12). The coefficient of high school education is higher for females; secondary education 
increases the probability of women being members of credit, burial and religious groups 
whereas it has no significant impact on men joining such groups.  The impact of age on 
membership in production groups is found only for males.  Belonging to the lowest asset 
quartiles has a negative impact on membership in production and burial groups for both men 
and women, but the size of this impact is larger for males.  Duration of residence in the 
community seems to affect only female membership in civic groups.  Since all of these 
households have been present in the community since the original survey in 1984, they all 
have at least 20 years of presence in the community, which might explain the low predictive 
power of this variable.  The higher the number of negative shocks experienced by the 
household, the more it is likely that female or male heads join credit groups. Credit groups are 
certainly considered a preferred option to mitigate the impact of adverse shocks in this setting.  
Shocks also positively influence membership in production groups for females and 





Interestingly, shocks have the opposite negative impact on membership in civic groups 
for females.  Stability of the household (lower experience of shocks, longer presence in the 
community) seems to have an impact only in the case of membership in civic groups.  Similar 
to its effects at the household level, distance to the town center has a significant negative 
impact on both male and female membership in groups except for production groups. This 
impact is always higher for females, perhaps because of lower control of transportation 
resources or because of greater opportunity costs of time for women.  Distance to hospital has 
a positive impact on female membership in credit groups.  Political unrest seems to have 
greater impact on male membership in groups with a positive impact on male membership in 
any group, in production, burial and religious groups.  However, a greater incidence of 
political unrest had a negative impact on membership in credit groups for women.  Similar to 
its impact at the household level, the presence of cooperatives operating in the village has a 
negative impact on the participation of men and women in any group, in credit and burial 
groups.  Government programs have a consistent positive impact on membership in credit 
groups. 
Group membership density 
While three-fourths of our sample households participate in at least one group, about 
half (46 percent) belong only to one group. Looking at the results of the estimation of the 
number of groups with an ordered probit (see Table 14
19) and comparing them with the results 
of the probit that the household or individual participates in at least one group (Tables 8 and 
12, respectively), we can differentiate between factors that have the same impact on both 
                                                      





regressions –education, distance to poblacion, village level ethnicity heterogeneity, number of 
cooperatives and government programs operating in the village- and factors that have a 
different impact, namely assets, religion, shocks, origin and asset heterogeneity and peace and 












It is indeed noticeable that households with better educated heads participate in more 
groups, as do households living closer to town centers. The household age composition as 
well as the household head or spouse age has no impact on the number of groups to which the 
household belongs.  Asset ownership has a significant impact on group membership density 
with richer households joining more groups.  Catholic households also tend to participate in 
more groups but this finding is driven by their higher participation in religious groups. 
Catholic households do not significantly participate in more groups when religious groups are 
excluded (results not reported here).  As 92 percent of the households are Catholics, it is 
easier to join existing or to create new religious groups for Catholic households:  35 percent 
of the Catholic households participated in at least one religious group whereas only 15 percent 
of the non-Catholic households participated in such a group. 
Group membership is lower in villages with higher ethnic diversity. As discussed 
above, it is unclear whether this results from greater difficulty in group creation or in 





groups households and men participate in, whereas asset heterogeneity has a negative impact 
on both, but both of these effects are not significant for women.  Households that experienced 
more negative shocks in the past are more likely to participate in more groups but this result 
seems to be driven by females participating in more groups as the number of past shocks 
increases.  Whether women are more risk-averse, or are designated by the family to act as 
insurers, needs further investigation.  Finally, political unrest has a positive impact on the 
number of groups the household belongs to but this effect is not significant for women. 
NETWORK DENSITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Do groups contribute to trust-based networks 
 
We use a very similar specification to examine the determinants of network density.  
We define network density as the number of persons that a household can turn to for help; this 
is defined in relation to specific circumstances (see descriptives).  Household network density 
can be modeled as a function of household characteristics and village-level attributes.  
Household characteristics include the age and education level of the household head, 
household size, household demographic composition, asset position, and the number of 
shocks experienced since 1984.  Because personal relationships may affect network formation 
more than economic considerations (Fafchamps and Gubert 2004), we include measures of 
kinship relationships within and outside the village:  the number of sons and daughters living 
inside and outside the village. We also include the measures of village-level heterogeneity 
described above.  Means and standard deviations of variables used in the network regressions 





An underlying question we wish to address is whether participation in groups 
increases network-based social capital.  We treat participation in groups as endogenous, using 
as instruments producer status dummies (agricultural producer only, non agricultural producer 
only, both agricultural and non agricultural producer), whether the household head is Catholic, 
distance from the sugar mill and 1984 per capita expenditures on church and groups.  Table 15 
presents ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares estimates of the determinants of 





Table 15—Determinants of network density, sum of all networks 
OLS and 2SLS estimates 
Dependent variable:  Sum of all networks    
  OLS estimates  2SLS estimates 
   Coeff   t  Coeff  z 
Number of groups a household belongs to in 2003  0.017  0.07  -0.236  -0.28 
Age of head in 2003  0.125  1.46  0.130  1.63 
Education level of the household head in 1984  0.383  2.40  0.417  2.31 
Household size in 2003  -0.094  -0.38  -0.077  -0.37 
Percentage of household members in 2003:         
Aged 0 to 14  1.287  0.40  1.199  0.43 
Aged 15 to 19  -0.263  -0.09  -0.684  -0.19 
Aged 55 and over  2.393  0.95  2.347  0.94 
Total asset value in 1984  0.008  2.31  0.008  2.35 
Other household characteristics         
Number of shocks, 1985-2003   0.511  1.91  0.565 1.61 
Indices of barangay heterogeneity         
Region of origin of the household head  1.842  0.55  2.372  0.64 
Asset heterogeneity (1984 household  assets)  0.000 0.62 0.000 0.89 
Ethnicity of the household head    -2.334 -1.09 -2.643 -1.10 
Education of the household  head  0.110 0.31 0.110 0.36 
Location of children living outside the household    
Number of daughters living outside the village   -0.558  -1.75  -0.552  -1.67 
Number of daughters living in the village    -0.016 -0.03 -0.044 -0.07 
Number of sons living outside the village   -0.226  -0.70  -0.198  -0.52 
Number of sons living in the village   1.026  1.54  1.032  1.78 
Constant  2.479 0.42 2.119 0.39 
Number of observations  310    310   
F  test  2.21   2.4  
p-value    0.00   0.00  
       
Over-id test (Sargan statistic)      9.48   
p-value       0.22  
Test of exogeneity (p value)         
Wu-Hausman F test      0.09  0.76 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test      0.10  0.75 




t or z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.  t-values are based on robust standard errors 
Instruments for group membership are: producer status dummies (agricultural producer only, nonagricultural 
business only, both agricultural producer and nonagricultural business), whether household head was Catholic in 
1984, distance from the sugar mill, per capita expenditures on church activities in 1984, and per capita 





Surprisingly, the total number of groups to which a household belongs does not affect 
the density of its networks.  The number of groups reduces the number of persons that one can 
rely on in case of significant economic loss.  It is possible that formal membership in groups 
reduces the need to use personal connections as insurance against significant economic loss.  
We also find that education of the household head increases network density across all 
types of socially-oriented networks, but only increases the number of individuals in the 
economic network related to price information.  Households with higher asset values in 1984 
have higher network density in general, and more individuals they can turn to in case of 
economic loss.  It thus seems that the asset-rich are also able to use networks to insure against 
economic losses.  Households that have experienced more shocks since 1984 also have higher 
network density in general, and higher density of networks related to taking care of the house, 
insurance from economic losses, and obtaining price information.  
Sons and daughters perform different functions in social and economic networks—a 
finding that can be traced to the different roles of men and women in Filipino society.  
Daughters are trained to be responsible and often play the role of insurers, migrating to towns 
and cities and then sending remittances to their origin households (Lauby and Stark 1988). 
The number of daughters living outside the village weakly reduces the number of networks a 
household belongs to in general, and the number of people in price-information and 
technology-adoption networks.  The number of daughters living in the village reduces the 
number of persons in one’s economic loss networks, perhaps because daughters can be relied 
upon to help the parents in times of economic loss.  In contrast, the number of sons living in 
the village affects only one type of network:  it increases the number of persons one can ask to 





It is possible that the total number of groups does not capture differences in group 
objectives, which could affect network density depending on the type of network.  Table 16 
presents ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regressions of the impact of group 
membership on network density for family problems, economic loss and price information, 





Table 16—Impact of group membership on networks for family problems, economic loss, and price information 
Coefficient of the effect of the probability of being a member on different types of groups on network density 
OLS and 2SLS estimates 
 
Family problems  OLS estimates  2SLS estimates  Overid test  Tests of 
exogeneity 
 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Sargan  statistic Wu-Hausman  Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
         chi-square 
-value -test 
p-value chi-square  p-value 






0.29 1.18  0.28 
Probability of participating in groups:         









































0.29 1.21  0.27 
            
                    
Economic loss  OLS estimates  2SLS estimates  Overid test  Tests of 
exogeneity 
  
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Sargan  statistic Wu-Hausman  Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
         chi-square 
-value -test 
p-value chi-square  p-value 











Table 16—Impact of group membership on networks for family problems, economic loss, and price information 
Coefficient of the effect of the probability of being a member on different types of groups on network density 
OLS and 2SLS estimates 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Sargan  statistic Wu-Hausman  Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
Probability of participating in groups:           









































0.33 1.02  0.31 
           
                    
Price information  OLS estimates  2SLS estimates  Overid test  Tests of 
exogeneity 
  
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Sargan  statistic Wu-Hausman  Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
        chi-square 
-value -test 
p-value chi-square  p-value 





.02  .00 
0.97 0.00  0.96 
Probability of participating in groups:           





.02  .12 






.02  .01 













.02  .01 





Table 16—Impact of group membership on networks for family problems, economic loss, and price information 
Coefficient of the effect of the probability of being a member on different types of groups on network density 
OLS and 2SLS estimates 






.02  .34 







0.30 1.16  0.28 
Regressors and excluded instruments are identical to the previous table 
Z statistics and p-values in bold are significant at 10% or better CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  55              





We find that the number of groups, as well as membership in burial groups, reduces 
the total number of persons a household can seek assistance from.   Death of a household 
member, especially an income earner, is one of the most frequent cases of income loss.  It is 
therefore interesting to find that membership in burial groups tends to compensate the need 
for a large network of support in times of economic loss.  Participation in groups does not 
seem to affect the size of the network related to family problems after instrumentation. 
However, participation in a credit group significantly increases the number of persons that can 
provide information on prices or places to sell products. 
Impact on household welfare: Is it capital? 
The previous section could not establish a clear link between group membership and 
the density of the household’s social network.  Here we investigate whether group 
membership can be considered as “capital”:  that is, whether it generates economic returns, 
such as a positive impact on per capita expenditures (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Haddad and 
Maluccio 2003).  Household expenditures were computed as the sum of expenditures on food 
consumption (purchased, produced, exchanged and received as a gift) and nonfood 
consumption (both purchased and received as a gift).  Both per capita and per adult equivalent 
expenditures were computed. As in the preceding section, we investigate whether the number 
of groups to which the household belongs as well as whether the household was a member of 
at least one social group has an impact on per capita expenditures.
20  We regress per capita 
                                                      
20 Results using expenditures per adult equivalent yield similar results that are not reported here; we discuss per 
capita expenditures for comparability with other studies. 





expenditures on human capital of the household head (age and age squared in 2003, whether 
the household head completed primary education, whether he completed secondary 
education), household demographics (household size and proportion of household members in 
various age groups), asset value in 1984, dummies for productive status and the distance from 
the household to the town center.  
We use 2SLS to estimate the impact of group membership on per capita expenditures 
to control for potential endogeneity of group membership.  The set of instruments includes, 
aside from regressors of per capita expenditures, variables explaining various forms of group 
membership that do not directly affect per capita expenditure, namely: village-level measures 
of heterogeneity (origin, ethnicity, asset and education), distance to the closest sugar mill, a 
dummy for Catholic household heads and the level of household per capita expenditures on 
groups in 1984. 
The results on the effect of the participation of groups on per capita expenditures are 





Table 17— Impact of group membership and network density on per capita expenditures 
OLS and 2LS regressions; coefficient reported is that of the type of group or network 
    OLS estimates  2SLS estimates      Tests of exogeneity   
   Coefficient  t  Coefficient  z  Sargan  overid test  Wu-Hausman  Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
                  chi-square  p-value  F-test  p-value  chi-square  p-value 
                   
Sum of all groups  14.080  0.35  -24.301  -0.27  14.69 0.02 0.19  0.66  0.20  0.65 
Probability of participating in groups:              
Any  group   -32.907  -0.24 -654.664  -1.63  10.39 0.11 2.78  0.10  2.92  0.09 
Production -48.724  -0.38  -343.517  -0.45  14.21  0.03  0.15 0.70 0.16 0.69 
Credit   -108.581  -0.99  -500.465  -0.98  13.19  0.04  0.62 0.43 0.65 0.42 
Burial   42.823  0.51  -155.020  -0.78  14.00  0.03  1.18 0.28 1.24 0.26 
Religious   116.198  1.62  -236.309  -0.86  13.49  0.04  1.69 0.19 1.78 0.18 
Civic   86.291  0.64  1754.612  1.96  4.97 0.55 5.81  0.02  6.03  0.01 
                   
Size of all networks  3.096  0.58  62.207 1.30  9.02 0.17 2.03  0.16  2.13  0.14 
Network density                  
Care  of  house  12.738  0.49 -555.875  -1.51  4.74 0.58 4.94  0.03  5.14  0.02 





Table 17— Impact of group membership and network density on per capita expenditures (continued) 
OLS and 2LS regressions; coefficient reported is that of the type of group or network 
    OLS estimates  2SLS estimates      Tests of exogeneity   
   Coefficient  t  Coefficient  z  Sargan  overid test  Wu-Hausman  Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
                  chi-square  p-value  F-test  p-value  chi-square  p-value 
Child  care   -62.200  -1.55 -394.035  -1.03  5.48 0.48 0.83  0.36  0.89  0.34 
Economic loss  -6.214  -0.28  58.919  0.80  12.98  0.04  0.82 0.36 0.87 0.35 
Price  information  17.337  1.28  72.710 0.74  10.14 0.12 0.32  0.57  0.34  0.56 
Technology  43.527  1.12  227.213 1.24  8.01 0.24 1.07  0.30  1.15  0.28 
Regressors include: age and age squared of the household head, dummies for elementary and secondary schooling and over, household size,  proportion in age 
categories ( 0-13, 15-19, 35-54, and over 55), total value of assets in 1984, dummies for productive status, and distance  to the poblacion (town center). 
Specific instruments are indices of village heterogeneity (region of origin of the household head, ethnicity of the household head, education of the household head 
and asset), dummies for productive status, distance from the village center to the nearest sugar mill, dummy for Catholic household head in 1984 and per capita 





Neither the number of groups to which the household belongs nor participation in at 
least one group has a significant impact on household per capita expenditures.  Membership in 
all of the reported groups can produce social externalities such as information sharing, 
copying or insurance but the groups differ as some are directly geared toward production, 
credit and insurance (burial groups) and others, such as religious and civic groups, are not 
economically motivated.  Since participation in economic oriented groups might have a higher 
impact on per capita expenditures, we present alternative specifications where group 
membership reflects group membership in production, credit, burial, religious and civic 
groups, respectively. Only membership in civic groups significantly increases per capita 
expenditures, although this result may be sensitive to the set of instruments we use.  In the 
second part of Table 17, we present the impact of the density of various informal networks on 
per capita expenditures.  The size of all informal networks as well as the size of most specific 
networks has no impact on per capita expenditures.  The only network that significantly 
increases per capita expenditures is the one related to family problems.  Since women take a 
more active role in maintaining the family’s social connections in Filipino culture, the 
composition of this network is probably dominated by women who comprise the wife’s social 
networks.  This effect may be similar to the positive impact of civic groups on per capita 
expenditures, as these groups are mostly women’s groups.  Our results therefore suggest that 









CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
This paper has found that asset-rich and better-educated households are more likely to 
participate in groups and to have larger social and economic assistance networks.  This may 
reflect higher returns to social capital for the wealthy, or greater barriers to participation for 
the poor. Disentangling self-selection and barriers to membership could not be addressed in 
this study but would provide very interesting information on the process of group 
participation.  Group membership is also affected by type of productive activity and distance 
to facilities; as expected, distance from the town center reduces the probability of joining 
groups, owing to higher transactions costs of group membership.  Different aspects of village-
level heterogeneity have different impacts on group membership:  ethnic heterogeneity 
reduces the probability that households participate in at least one group and in burial groups, 
but origin heterogeneity increases participation in production groups and burial groups.  
Education heterogeneity reduces participation in credit groups, but asset heterogeneity 
increases it.  The persistent negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity, even in the individual 
regressions, points to long-standing differences between ethnic groups that are not conducive 
to social cohesion.  Greater exposure to shocks and a higher incidence of peace and order 
problems increase group membership, probably owing to insurance motives.  Men and 
women have equal propensities to participate in groups and do not differ significantly in the 
number of groups they join.  However, there are clear gender differences in the types of 





groups; women, civic groups.  This may reflect a gender division of labor within the 
household or separate spheres of decision-making. 
Our findings suggest that the delivery of services through existing groups by 
development agencies is likely to leave vulnerable households behind. For example, using 
production groups as conduits for service delivery will be less likely to reach women, the 
asset and education poor, as well as households living in remote places.  Moreover, some 
environments are less conducive for group membership and external agencies should take into 
account barangay level heterogeneity in their attempts at group formation. 
In contrast, very few economic variables affect the size of the household’s assistance 
networks.  Network density does increase with education and assets, again showing that the 
rich are better able to invest in informal social capital.  Kinship variables are also significant 
determinants of the size of one’s networks. Households may invest less in mutual assistance 
networks if relatives (particularly daughters, in the Philippine context) can act as insurers. The 
number of sons living in the village increases the number of persons one can ask to look after 
one’s house but has no effect on other type of networks, especially the economic support 
network. 
We also find that group membership does not, in general, increase network density, 
although it may affect the formation of specific types of assistance networks. Households 
belonging to more groups have smaller networks that insure against economic loss, possibly 
because formal groups perform this insurance function.  Finally, we do not find evidence of 
positive returns to group membership in terms of increased per capita expenditures. 
Why does group membership not yield direct economic benefits in terms of increased 





benefits, why do people join groups? A statement by the municipal officer for agrarian reform 
in one of our survey sites (Kitaotao) highlighted that group membership could also facilitate 
the acquisition of political power: “Most of our leaders in the agrarian reform committee 
come from religious groups”.  It is also possible that the social and political environment may 
not be conducive to capturing the economic benefits of group membership.  Maluccio et al. 
(2000), for example, find that in South Africa, social capital had no apparent return to 
households in 1993, but substantial returns in 1998 after apartheid had been abolished.  
Access to financial resources and insurance provided by groups (credit groups, burial groups) 
are economic benefits per se.  However, the economic returns households derive from these 
might vary among different types of households, with some households benefiting a lot from 
group membership and others faring worse.  The distribution of returns to group membership 
might also differ across gender, which we cannot investigate with our data.  The lack of 
network-based returns to group membership is an issue that also deserves further investigation 
in future qualitative work. 
A related issue is the extent to which investment in “migration capital” complements 
or substitutes for “local” social capital.  Migration is an important livelihood strategy in the 
Philippines—in 1991, twenty-six percent of urban households and 13 percent of rural 
households received remittances from migrant parents or children (Cox and Jimenez 1995).  
In our study sample, close to half — 47 percent—of children 15 and older are migrants to 
rural, peri-urban and urban areas in the Philippines, as well as overseas.  Similar to the 
national pattern, a higher proportion of migrants is female.  Do households with migrant 





children?  Or do households with more migrant members participate more in social networks 
to compensate for lack of interaction with distant family members? 
Qualitative methods may be better suited to probing some of the unanswered questions 
raised by this initial quantitative analysis.  In particular, qualitative methods may be better 
able to uncover the motives behind network formation and group membership.  The 
evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of group membership might be strengthened by a 
differentiation of quality and type of participation and from the evaluation of power and 
gender relations within these networks.  Qualitative methods may also be better suited to 
explore the roles and types of informal networks more deeply.  Questions on the number of 
people that the person would turn to in a given situation could be expanded to consider the 
nature of the relationship with this person, and to include a mapping of networks through case 
studies. Another issue to consider is whether and how these networks are ‘gendered’ in terms 
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Table A1—Means and standard deviations of variables used in the group membership 
regressions  
Number of observations=311 
    
Variables  Mean SD 
Dependent variables    
Number of groups per household  1.56  1.52 
Membership in all groups (dummy variable)     
   All groups  0.76 0.43 
   Production group  0.27  0.44 
   Credit group  0.22  0.41 
   Burial group  0.32  0.47 
   Religious group  0.33  0.47 
   Civic group  0.22  0.41 
    
Regressors    
Dummy:1 for female head or spouse  0.51  0.50 
Age of head  36.32  8.23 
Age of head squared  1386.47  623.11 
Elementary education: Head has 6 years of schooling or more  0.38  0.49 
High school education: head has 10 years of schooling or more  0.15  0.36 
Household size   5.72  2.49 
Percentage of household members aged 0 to 14  0.22  0.18 
Percentage of household members aged 15 to 49  0.13  0.14 
Percentage of household members aged 35 to 54  0.23  0.20 
Percentage of household members aged 55 and over  0.19  0.25 
Asset quartile (in 1984; highest quartile excluded)    





Table A1—Means and standard deviations of variables used in the group membership 
regressions (continued) 
Number of observations=311 
    
Variables  Mean SD 
Lowest asset quartile  0.16  0.37 
Second asset quartile  0.26  0.44 
Third asset quartile  0.28  0.45 
Proportion of asset in total asset value in 1984 x 100; housing and consumer durables excluded 
Land  18.21 25.49 
Productive assets  16.74  17.23 
Livestock  14.34 16.72 
Dummies for type of household 
Sugar producing household   0.36  0.48 
Agricultural producer household  0.72  0.45 
Nonagricultural producer household  0.31  0.46 
Household head is Catholic   0.92  0.28 
Number of years the household has been present in the community  41.81  8.55 
Number of negative shocks reported by the household from 1984 
until 2001  1.98 1.37 
Distance from household     
Distance to town center (kilometers)  5.37  3.59 
Travel time to nearest hospital in 1984 (minutes)  60.54  46.24 
Distance to nearest sugar mill (kilometers)  22.58  9.43 
Indices of barangay heterogeneity    
Region of origin of the household head  0.55  0.14 
Asset heterogeneity (based on 1984 assets)  695.52  859.45 





Table A1—Means and standard deviations of variables used in the group membership 
regressions (continued) 
Number of observations=311 
Variables  Mean SD 
Education of the household head  6.74  1.35 
Percentage of households affected by peace and order problems 
since 1984  16.59 49.44 
Programs operating in barangay, 2000-2001 
Cooperatives  0.34 0.49 
NGO programs  0.19  0.50 
Government programs  0.45  0.75 





Table A2—Means and standard deviations of variables used in attrition analysis  
Number of observations=510 
Variables Mean  SD 
Dependent variable    
Probability of being in the sample in 2003  0.61  0.49 
Regressors    
Age of the household head in 1984  35.68  8.38 
Age of the household head in 1984, squared  1342.81  631.84 
Years of schooling of the household head in 1984  5.63  3.04 
Asset quartile (in 1984; highest quartile excluded) 
Lowest asset quartile  0.25  0.43 
Second asset quartile  0.25  0.43 
Third asset quartile  0.25  0.43 
Proportion of asset in total asset value in 1984 x 100; housing and consumer durables 
excluded 
Land 17.37  26.52 
Productive assets  19.35  21.91 
Livestock 12.92  16.77 
Share of household members age 15-65    
Share aged 55-64  0.01  0.07 
Share aged 45 to 54  0.06  0.14 
Share aged 35 to 45  0.30  0.32 
Share aged 25 to 34  0.74  0.29 
Share of female working age household members  0.48  0.10 
Number of household working age members  2.70  1.16 
Distance from the household to the village center 





Table A2—Means and standard deviations of variables used in attrition analysis 
(continued) 
Number of observations=510 
Variables Mean  SD 
Travel time from household to nearest hospital in 
1984 (minutes)  59.27 43.93 
Distance from the village center to Busco sugar mill 
(kilometers) 31.69  14.30 
Percentage of other households interviewed in the 
village in both 1984/85 and 2003  0.88  0.09 
Percentage increase in the number of households in 
the village, 1980-2000  0.74  0.42 





Table A3—Means and standard deviations of variables used in the network analysis  
Variables  Mean SD 
Dependent variables    
Number of persons in all the household's networks, N=310  13.30  7.48 
Number of persons that can help in case of important economic loss, N=310  0.75  0.43 
Number of persons that can help look after the house in an emergency, N=311  1.82  1.29 
Number of persons that can help with prices or places to sell products, N=254 (1)  2.41  2.23 
Number of persons that can look after the household's young children in an emergency, N=215 (2)  1.66  0.91 
Number of persons the household would confine with in case of family problems, N=311  0.58  0.49 
Number of persons the household would follow if they adopted a new technology, N=222 (3)  1.80  1.21 
    
Regressors    
Age of the household head in 2003  54.76  7.74 
Years of schooling of the household head in 1984  5.70  3.12 
Household size  5.72 2.49 
Share of household members    
Share aged 0-14  0.22 0.18 
Share aged 15-19  0.13 0.14 
Share aged 35-54  0.23 0.20 
Share aged 55 and over  0.19 0.25 
Number of years the household has been present in the community  41.81  8.55 
Number of negative shocks reported by the household from 1984 until 2001  1.98  1.37 
Indices of barangay heterogeneity    





Table A3—Means and standard deviations of variables used in the network analysis (continued) 
Variables Mean  SD 
Asset heterogeneity (based on 1984 assets)  695.52  859.45 
Ethnicity of the household head   0.47  0.19 
Education of the household head  6.74  1.35 
Children's location    
Number of daughters living outside the parents' village  2.03  1.68 
Number of daughters living in the parents' village  0.48  0.83 
Number of sons living outside the parents' village  1.62  1.46 
Number of sons living in the parents' village  0.50  0.87 
(1) The sample is defined over households operating a non agricultural business and 
households engaged in agricultural production 
(2) The sample is defined over households with at least one child under 15 





Table A4--Determinants of the total number of groups, by individual, tobit model 
Specification with sampling weights 
Sample consists of the husband and wife (head and spouse) 
 Whole  sample  Male  Female 
 Coeff  z  Coeff  z  Coeff  Z 
Dependent variable:  Total number of groups in which one is a member 
Sex (1 if female)  -0.058  -0.41         
Age of head in 2003  -0.029  -0.31  -0.190  -1.39  0.221  1.39 
Age of head in 2003, squared  0.001  0.61  0.002  1.62  -0.002  -1.27 
Elementary education: Head has 6 years of 
schooling or more  0.120 0.76  0.002  0.01  0.278  1.15 
High school education: head has 10 years of 
schooling or more  1.207  5.39  0.742  2.50  1.745  5.12 
Household size in 2003  0.067 1.64  0.071  1.29  0.073  1.24 
Percentage of household members in 2003:            
Aged 0 to 14  0.598  1.18  0.591  0.88  0.391  0.52 
Aged 15 to 19  -0.761  -1.27  -1.966  -2.47  0.159 0.18 
Aged 35 to 54  0.836  1.29  1.060  1.21  0.292  0.31 
Aged 55 and over  0.299  0.49  0.127  0.15  0.565  0.66 
Asset quartile (in 1984; highest quartile 
excluded)            
Lowest asset quartile  -0.906  -2.92  -0.913  -2.20  -0.887  -2.00 





Table A4--Determinants of the total number of groups, by individual, tobit model (continued) 
Specification with sampling weights 
Sample consists of the husband and wife (head and spouse) 
 Whole  Sample  Male Female 
 Coeff  z  Coeff  z  Coeff  z 
Third asset quartile  -0.667  -3.10  -0.722  -2.53  -0.596  -1.91 
Proportion of asset in total asset value in 1984 x 100; housing and consumer durables excluded 
Land 0.002  0.47  0.003  0.66  0.003  0.53 
Productive assets  0.003  0.62 0.001  0.19  0.005 0.76 
Livestock -0.005  -0.91  -0.005 -0.76  -0.003  -0.34 
Dummies for type of household in 2003          
Sugar producing household   0.376  2.11  0.390  1.67  0.323 1.23 
Agricultural producer household  -0.206  -1.11  0.019  0.07  -0.465  -1.77 
Nonagricultural producer household 0.010  0.07  0.056  0.27  -0.131  -0.58 
Other household characteristics          
Household head is Catholic   0.732  2.81  0.647  1.92  0.843  2.17 
Years present in community  -0.010  -1.10  -0.018  -1.50  -0.007  -0.51 
Number of shocks   0.148  2.86  0.093 1.35  0.198  2.68 
Distance from household           





Table A4--Determinants of the total number of groups, by individual, tobit model (continued) 
Specification with sampling weights 
Sample consists of the husband and wife (head and spouse) 
 Whole  Sample  Male  Female 
 Coeff  z  Coeff  z  Coeff  z 
Travel time to nearest hospital in 1984 
(minutes)  0.001 0.58  0.000  0.03  0.003 1.17 
Distance to nearest sugar mill (kilometers)  0.020  1.89  0.010 0.71  0.030 1.95 
Indices of barangay heterogeneity           
Region of origin of the household head  1.680  2.43  2.528  2.72  0.787 0.79 
Asset heterogeneity (1984 household assets)  0.000  -1.96  0.000  -2.76  0.000 -0.38 
Ethnicity of the household head   -2.174  -5.02  -2.247  -3.97  -2.102  -3.33 
Education of the household head  -0.055 -1.03  -0.051  -0.72  -0.044 -0.56 
Percentage of households affected by peace 
and order problems since 1984  0.004  2.87  0.006  3.29  0.002 0.93 
Programs operating in barangay, 2000-2001           
Cooperatives -0.678  -4.20  -0.523  -2.45  -0.829  -3.52 
NGO programs  -0.058  -0.36  -0.249  -1.12  0.064  0.28 
Government programs  0.208  1.93  0.159 1.10  0.258 1.68 
Constant 0.784  0.28  5.601  1.29  -5.541  -1.26 
            





Table A4--Determinants of the total number of groups, by individual, tobit model (continued) 
Specification with sampling weights 
Sample consists of the husband and wife (head and spouse) 
 
 Whole  sample  Male  Female 
 Coeff  z  Coeff  z  Coeff  z 
LR chi2(33)    237.14    126.92    141.92   
Prob > chi2    0.00    0.00    0.00   
Pseudo R2      0.13    0.15    0.15   
            
Censored observations  227    102    125   
Uncensored observations  353    175    178   
z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or 
better           
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